A secret sharing scheme is a cryptographic protocol by means of which a dealer shares a secret among a set of participants in such a way that it can be subsequently reconstructed by certain quali ed subsets. The setting we consider is the following: in a rst phase, the dealer gives in a secure way a piece of information, called a share, to each participant. Then, participants belonging to a quali ed subset send in a secure way their shares to a trusted party, referred to as a combiner, who computes the secret and sends it back to the participants.
Introduction
Secret sharing schemes are a fundamental primitive in cryptography. They were introduced in 1979 by Blakley 1] and Shamir 13] . The reader can nd an introduction and references to the literature in 14] .
In its basic form, a secret sharing scheme is a protocol divided into two phases: Share and Reconstruct. During Share, a dealer distributes a secret among a set of participants by sending in a secure way a piece of information to each of them, called a share. Then, during Reconstruct, some subsets of participants (called quali ed subsets) can reconstruct the secret either by pooling together their shares, or by sending their shares in a secure way to a trusted party (called a combiner) who collects the shares, reconstructs the secret, and sends it back to these participants 1 . Other subsets (called forbidden subsets), even by pooling together and processing their shares, do not learn any information about the secret. In such a model, the dealer and participants are assumed to be honest.
However, many applications have to deal with the case of dishonest participants and (possibly) a dishonest dealer. Tompa and Woll in 16] showed that Shamir's threshold scheme can be subject to the following attack (which can be applied to all linear secret sharing schemes). A dishonest participant, during Reconstruct, can submit to the combiner an opportunely constructed fake share. Hence, the reconstructed secret is di erent from the original one. But, from this secret, the dishonest participant (and only he) can recover the original secret.
For example, consider the simple secret sharing scheme where the secret K is the modulo-q sum of three shares: K = s 1 + s 2 + s 3 mod q. If the rst participant submits an incorrect share, say s 0 1 6 = s 1 , then the combiner outputs the value K 0 = s 0 1 + s 2 + s 3 mod q. Given K 0 , the rst participant can compute the correct secret K = K 0 + s 1 ? s 0 1 mod q. The second and third participants may not even know that the value K 0 is incorrect. In any event, they cannot compute K even if they do know that K 0 is incorrect.
Tompa and Woll showed in 16] how to modify Shamir's scheme to avoid such an attack. Other papers which deal with the model analysed by Tompa and Woll include 4, 5] .
In order to design secret sharing schemes that keep working even in hostile environments, the concept of veri ability was introduced in 7] . With this more general approach, some extra information is used to enable participants to detect a dishonest dealer, who sends inconsistent shares during Share, and to verify during Reconstruct that each participant submits a correct share. A lot of research has been done for both unconditionally secure and computationally secure veri able secret sharing schemes (see 3, 6, 9, 15, 12] , to name a few papers). Veriable secret sharing schemes have been widely used in multi-party computation and in other applications of secret sharing schemes.
However, the world of applications is quite varied and veri able secret sharing schemes are not always necessary. Morever, the computation, communication, and round complexities of veri able secret sharing schemes are considerably greater than in the basic model for secret sharing. Therefore, achieving some forms of limited protection against cheaters in the basic model remains an interesting research problem. Along this line, a di erent approach to deal with cheating in secret sharing schemes was suggested by Pieprzyk and Zhang in 17, 10, 11] . In the model therein considered, called cheating-immune secret sharing, the 1 In this paper we deal only with the latter reconstruction mode.
dealer and combiner are assumed to be honest. Participants can cheat, during Reconstruct, by submitting incorrect shares to the combiner. Such a secret sharing scheme is said to be cheating-immune if cheaters, on submitting incorrect shares, have no advantage (as compared to honest users) in determining the true secret. Notice that the combiner will only hear from some quali ed subset of participants, and some bounded number of these may be cheaters.
It is perhaps useful to point out that, despite some super cial resemblances, cheatingimmune and veri able secret sharing schemes are solving two di erent problems. A veri able secret sharing scheme is one that tolerates incorrect shares, allowing the correct secret to be reconstructed even when certain shares are faulty, via a process of detection and/or correction of the faulty shares. A cheating-immune secret sharing scheme will not compute the correct secret if a submitted share is faulty. The objective is rather to prevent cheaters from being able to compute the secret when honest participants cannot do so. Organization of the paper: In Section 2, we give some background on secret sharing schemes: we recall the concepts of perfect and ideal secret sharing schemes. In Section 3, we describe a model for cheating-immune secret sharing scheme, which is the same given in 10], and in Section 4 we recall a characterization for such schemes; while, in Section 5, we point out a relation with resilient functions, which enables us to prove an upper bound on the number of possible cheaters in any (n; n) threshold scheme. In Section 6, we repair a previously proposed construction for cheating-immune secret sharing schemes. Finally, in Section 7, we state some results for the case of ramp schemes.
Perfect Secret Sharing Scheme
In this section we brie y recall the de nition and some properties of perfect secret sharing schemes.
Let P be a set of participants and let S be a set of possible secrets. The collection of subsets A 2 P ; quali ed to reconstruct the secret, is usually referred to as the access structure of the secret sharing scheme. Denoting by S a random variable representing the choice of a secret in S, by A the shares received by a subset of participants A 2 A, and using the entropy function 2 , we can state the following de nition:
De nition 2.1 A perfect secret sharing scheme with secrets chosen in S, for the access structure A 2 P , is a protocol consisting of a Share phase and a Reconstruct phase, satisfying two conditions: 1: Every quali ed subset of participants can compute the secret:
Formally, for all A 2 A, it holds that H(SjA) = 0.
2: Any forbidden subset of participants gets absolutely no information on the secret value:
Formally, for all A 6 2 A, it holds that H(SjA) = H(S). Property 1: means that the value of the shares held by A 2 A uniquely determines the secret s 2 S. On the other hand, Property 2 means that the probability that the secret is equal to s given that the shares held by A 6 2 A are a, is the same as the a priori probability of the secret s. In other words, by pooling together their shares, a forbidden subset of 2 The reader is referred to Appendix A for the de nition of the entropy function and some basic properties. participant gets absolutely no information about the secret. If Property 2: is not satis ed, i.e., H(SjA) < H(S), then a secret sharing scheme is said to be not perfect.
A secret sharing scheme can be represented by a matrix M, where each row corresponds to a possible distribution of shares for a certain secret. More precisely, in this representation, the rst column of M is indexed by the dealer D, and contains the possible secret values he may wish to share, and the remaining columns are indexed by the participants in P, and represent the shares they can get for each secret. This model has been proposed in 14] . The e ciency of a secret sharing scheme is measured by means of an information rate, which relates the size of the secret to the size of the shares given to the participants. More precisely, given a secret sharing scheme for the access structure A, on the set of secrets S, and denoting by K(P) the set of possible shares for participant P, we de ne the information rate ( ; A; S) as ( ; A; S) = log jSj max P2P log jK(P)j and the optimal information rate of A as (A) = sup ( ; A; S) where the sup is taken over the space of all possible sets of secrets S, such that jSj 2, and all secret sharing schemes for A. Secret sharing schemes with information rate equal to one, which is the maximum possible value of this parameter (i.e., the secret and the shares have the same size), are called ideal.
Cheating-Immune Model
We consider ideal secret sharing schemes with shares and values in GF(p t ). More precisely, we start by considering (n; n) secret sharing schemes ((n; n)-SSS, for short), i.e., schemes where all shares held by n participants are required to reconstruct the secret. The model and the notation are the same as in 10].
Let GF(p t ) denote a nite eld with p t elements, where p is a prime number and t is a positive integer. Let GF(p t ) n be the vector space of n-tuples of elements from GF(p t ). For each = ( 1 ; : : :; n ) 2 GF(p t ) n , we denote by HW( ) (Hamming Weight) the number of non-zero coordinates of .
In our setting, a vector 2 GF(P t ) n represents the shares the participants get from the dealer during Share. The secret sharing scheme is represented by a de ning function, f : GF(p t ) n ! GF(p t ); which associates to each n-tuple of shares a secret value in GF(p t ). De nition 3.1 10] An (n; n)-SSS with shares and values in GF(p t ) is said to be k-cheatingimmune if, for every 2 GF(p t ) n and any 2 GF(p t ) n , with 1 HW( ) k, it holds that ; = p ?t .
A 1-cheating-immune secret sharing scheme will be simply referred to as a cheatingimmune secret sharing scheme. Notice that the above de nition assumes that all the cheaters submit fake shares. When k > 1, a more general de nition takes into account the possibility that some subset of the cheaters submit correct shares. The underlying idea that justi es such an extension of the model is that there could be a strategy by means of which a coalition of cheaters can gain more information if only some of them submit incorrect shares. More precisely, we use a binary vector to identify the cheaters and a vector 2 GF(p t ) n to specify how much they cheat and, for every , we de ne 4 Characterisation for k-Cheating-Immune Secret Sharing
In this section we show some results about cheating-immune secret sharing schemes. We start by proving that a perfect secret sharing scheme cannot be cheating-immune. More precisely, we can state the following:
Theorem 4.1 Let be an (n; n)-secret sharing scheme with shares and values in GF(p t ). If is perfect, then cannot be cheating-immune.
Proof. For simplicity, assume the set of shares and secrets is GF (2) . In this case, the de ning function, f, is given by
Moreover, assume that 0 and 1, the values the secret can assume, are uniformly distributed. with respect to any and = (0; : : :; 0; 1; 0; : : :0), with a single one in position i n . A similar argument can be used for the case in which the set of shares and secrets is GF(p t ).
Notice that, if De nition 3.1 is extended to the case of general (ideal) access structures A, de ned over the set of participants P, the above result still holds. Indeed, the key point in the above proof is that Condition 2 of De nition 2.1 rules out, from the point of view of participant i n , one possible secret; hence, ; 6 = 1 p t . A cheating-immune secret sharing scheme will satisfy property 1: of De nition 2.1, namely, a quali ed subset of shares will determine the value of the secret. Therefore it follows from Theorem 4.1 that property 2: cannot be satis ed. Hence, in a cheating-immune secret sharing scheme, some forbidden subsets of participants will, in some circumstances, be able to determine some (partial) information about the secret by pooling their shares.
The structure of the de ning function f of a cheating-immune secret sharing scheme can be precisely characterized. The following result was shown in 10]. We recall this characterization by giving a slightly simpli ed proof, compared to the one given in 10]. Theorem 4.2 Let be an (n; n)-SSS with shares and values in GF(p t ). Then, is kcheating-immune , for any integer`, where 1 ` k, for any 2 GF(p t ) n , such that HW( ) =`, for any , and for any u; v 2 GF(p t ), the following conditions hold simultaneously:
(i) jR( ; ; v)j = p t(n?`?1) , (ii) j(R( ; ; v) \ R( ; + ; u))j = p t(n?`?2) . Proof. The rst implication is immediate: indeed, if (i) and (ii) hold, then the scheme is k-cheating immune. Hence, given a k-cheating immune secret sharing scheme, we have to show that (i) and (ii) hold. Let HW( ) =`. For any ; 2 GF(p t ) n , the family of subsets fR( ; + + ; K )g K 2GF(p t ) is a partition of the set fx ? j 2 GF(p t ) n and x ? 2 GF(p t ) n g GF(p t ) n . Since jfx ? j 2 GF(p t ) n and x ? 2 GF(p t ) n gj = p t(n?`) , we have that and, by using equation (1) Therefore, the result holds. In this section we investigate the relation between k-cheating-immune secret sharing scheme over GF(p t ) and resilient functions. Such a relation has already been pointed out for the binary case (k-cheating-immune secret sharing scheme over GF(2)) in 11, 17] . We use it to state an upper bound on the number of possible cheaters tolerated in a cheating-immune secret sharing scheme. In other words, each value f(x) 2 GF(p t ) has the same number of pre-images x. De nition 5.2 A function f : GF(p t ) n ! GF(p t ) is said to be k-resilient if, for every subset fj 1 ; : : :; j k g f1; : : :; ng and every (a 1 ; : : :; a k ) 2 GF(p t ) k , the function f(x 1 ; : : :; x n )j x j 1 =a 1 ;:::;x j k =a k is balanced over GF(p t ) n?k .
Notice that, if f : GF(p t ) n ! GF(p t ) is the de ning function of a perfect (n; n)-SSS where the secrets are chosen uniformly at random, then, for any 1 k < n, f is k-resilient. This property easily follows from Condition 2 of De nition 2.1.
The next corollary, concerning k-cheating-immune secret sharing schemes, easily follows from Theorem 4.2.
Corollary 5.3 Let be an (n; n)-SSS, and let f : GF(p t ) n ! GF(p t ) be the de ning function of . If is k-cheating-immune, then f is k-resilient.
On the other hand, we can prove the following result:
Theorem 5.4 Let be an (n; n)-SSS, and let f : GF(p t ) n ! GF(p t ) be the de ning function of . If is k-cheating-immune, then f cannot be (n ? k)-resilient. Proof. We need some notation and preliminary results. (5) Equation (5) holds for 1 s k; while, when s = 0, we have jQ K; j = jfvjv 2 R K; ; f(v) = Kgj = jfvjf(v) = Kgj = p t(n?1) : (6) For any subset a f1; 2; ; sg and a = f1; 2; ; sg n a, let S( ; a) = fu 2 GF(p t ) s j8i 2 a; u j i = j i and 8i 2 a; u j i 6 = j i g:
Notice that if a and b are di erent subsets, then S( ; a) \ S( ; b) = ;. Moreover From equations (5) and (6) = p tk p t(n?2) = p t(n+k?2) ; (8) which clearly contradicts (7). Therefore, f cannot be n ? k-resilient.
At this point, we can state the main result of this section. 6 A Construction for k-Cheating-Immune Secret Sharing
We present a construction for k-cheating-immune secret sharing applying the ideas of the construction given in 10]. Basically, we use a new function as a building block for the scheme, instead of the function described (unfortunately, the function proposed is not balanced, as the construction requires).
In the following, if 1 denotes the identity in GF(p t ), we indicate the sum of dp=2e elements equal to 1 by b + p , and the sum of bp=2c elements equal to 1 by b ? p . Therefore, for any a 2 GF(p t ) n , the term b + p a (b ? p a, resp.) is the sum of dp=2e (bp=2c, resp.) elements equal to a. In order to show the properties of our new function, we need some results, that we brie y recall.
De nition 6. The function we use in order to set up a k-cheating-immune secret sharing scheme is de ned as follows:
Lemma 6.3 Let n 2k + 1, and let n;p : GF(p t ) n ! GF(p t ) be a function de ned by
where i] (n) denotes the integer j such that 1 j n, and j i mod n. Then, (i) n;p is balanced, and (ii) n;p satis es the property B(k).
Proof. For any 2 j n, by de nition, n;p has p quadratic terms including x j , which Therefore, it is easy to verify that g(x + ) ? g(x) = 0. Hence, n;p (x + ) ? n;p (x) = 1, and n;p ( ) = 1. Using Lemma 6.2, we can conclude that n;p is balanced. When n is even, we can also show that n;p is balanced, similarly.
To show that (ii) of the lemma holds, we can proceed as follows: Let = ( 1 ; : : :; n ) 2 GF(p t ) n be a cheating vector such that HW( ) =`, where 1 ` k. Moreover, let It is not di cult to see that 3;3 is balanced. Indeed, we have Notice that 3;3 (0; 0; 0) = 0 and, for = (1; 1; 1), it holds that 3;3 (1; 1; 1) = 1: Moreover, simple algebra shows that Then, the function 4k+2 is balanced and satis es the property B(k):
Finally, a k-cheating-immune secret sharing scheme can be realized as follows: Theorem 6.6 10] Let k and s be positive integers with s k + 1, and let n 1 ; : : :; n s 2 f4k + 1; 4k + 2g; such that n = n 1 + + n s : Let f(x) be a function de ned over GF(p t ) n by f(x) = n 1 (x 1 ) + : : : + ns (x s ), where x = (x 1 ; : : :; x s ), and, for i = 1; : : :; s, the value x i 2 GF(p t ) n i : If each n i is constructed according to Lemma 6.3 or Lemma 6.5, and n 1 ; : : :; ns have mutually disjoint variables, then the secret sharing scheme with de ning function f(x) is k-cheating-immune. Example 6.2 We give an example of an (11; 11) cheating-immune secret sharing scheme.
Let k = 1, s = 2, and p = 5. Moreover, let us set, according to Theorem 6.6, n 1 = 5 and n 2 = 6. It follows that n = n 1 + n 2 = 11: Let us start by constructing the functions 5 f(x) = 5 (z 1 ) + 6 (z 2 ); where x = (z 1 ; z 2 ): By plugging in the above pieces, we get the explicit form:
f(x) = f(x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ; x 4 ; x 5 ; x 6 ; x 7 ; x 8 ; x 9 ; x 10 ; x 11 ) = x 1 + 2x 1 x 2 + 3x 2 x 3 + 2x 3 x 4 + 3x 4 x 5 + 2x 5 x 1 + 3x 1 x 1 +x 6 + 2x 6 x 7 + 3x 7 x 8 + 2x 8 x 6 + 3x 6 x 6 +x 9 + 2x 9 x 10 + 3x 10 x 11 + 2x 11 x 9 + 3x 11 x 11 :
A construction for strictly k-cheating-immune secret sharing schemes, which basically generalises the above one, can be found in 10].
Ramp Secret Sharing Schemes
The idea of a ramp secret sharing scheme has been introduced in 2]. More precisely, a ramp secret sharing scheme ((t 1 ; t 2 ; n)-RS, for short) is a protocol by means of which a dealer distributes a secret s among a set of n participants P in such a way that subsets of P of size greater than or equal to t 2 can reconstruct the value of s; no subset of P of size less than or equal to t 1 can determine anything about the value of the secret; and a subset of size t 1 < t < t 2 can recover some information about the secret 2]. Using the entropy function 8], the three properties of a (linear) (t 1 ; t 2 ; n)-RS can be stated as follows. Assuming that A denotes both a subset of participants and the set of shares these participants receive from the dealer to share a secret s 2 S, and denoting the corresponding random variables in bold, it holds that
Any subset of participants of size less than or equal to t 1 has no information on the secret value: Formally, for each subset A P of size jAj t 1 , H(SjA) = H(S):
Any subset of participants of size t 1 < jAj < t 2 has some information on the secret value: Formally, for each subset A P of size t 1 < jAj < t 2 , H(SjA) = jAj?t 1 t 2 ?t 1 H(S): Any subset of participants of size greater than t 2 can compute the whole secret: Formally, for each subset A P of size jAj t 2 , H(SjA) = 0:
It can be easily seen that the de ning function of a (t 1 ; t 2 ; n)-RS, where the secrets are chosen uniformly at random, is t 1 -resilient. Applying the same arguments we have applied before, and using Theorem 5.4, we can show the following: Theorem 7.1 A (t 1 ; t 2 ; n)-ramp secret sharing scheme de ned by f : GF(p t ) n ! GF(p t ) can be k-cheating-immune only if k < n ? t 1 .
Conclusions and Open Problems
We have studied some properties and constraints holding for cheating-immune secret sharing schemes. We have shown that a perfect secret sharing scheme cannot be cheating-immune, and we have given an upper bound on the number of tolerated cheaters in such schemes. Then, we have repaired an existing construction to realize cheating-immune secret sharing schemes. Interesting open problems are secret sharing constructions for threshold and general (ideal) access structures. Another interesting research line could be the generalization of the de nition of cheating-immunity: at the moment, it is implicitly assumed that the secrets are chosen by the dealer uniformly at random. If the dealer chooses the secret according to a certain probability distribution on the space of secrets, we have to require that, when the cheaters submit fake shares, the probability distribution that they infer over the set of possible true secrets (once the incorrect secret has been reconstructed) must be the same as the one that the honest participants infer (i.e., there is no advantage for the cheaters compared to the honest users).
where the logarithm is to the base 2. The entropy function satis es the inequality 0 H(X) log jXj; where H(X) = 0 if and only if there exists x 0 2 X such that Pr(X = x 0 ) = 1; whereas, H(X) = log jXj if and only if Pr(X = x) = 1=jXj, for all x 2 X. The entropy of a random variable is usually interpreted as a measure of the equidistribution of the random variable a measure of the amount of information given on average by the random variable.
Given two random variables X and Y taking values on sets X and Y , respectively, according to the joint probability distribution fP XY (x; y)g x2X;y2Y on their cartesian product, 
